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This paper analyzes the effect of the changing nature of innovation on pharmaceutical firm 
market value from the years 1987 to 2010 by using U.S. patent and claim data. Over the years, 
firms have started shifting focus from primary innovation to secondary innovation as new ideas 
and new compounds become more difficult to generate. In this study, we analyze the impact of 
this patent portfolio shift on the market capitalization of pharmaceutical firms. After using firm 
fixed effects and the instrumental variable approach, we find that there exists a strong positive 
relationship between secondary innovations and the market value of the firm– in fact, we find a 
stronger relationship than is observed between primary innovation and market value. When 
focusing on the different levels of innovation within the industry, we find that this relationship is 
stronger for less-innovative firms (those that have produced fewer patents) than it is for highly-
innovative firms. We also find that this relationship is stronger for firms that spend less on 
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I.   Introduction 
The motivation behind researching the pharmaceutical industry is that its massive size 
and strong patent protection creates opportunities for huge amounts of profit, attracting hundreds 
of firms that incur huge costs. From 1980 to 2014, the U.S. economy grew approximately five 
times larger, whereas the amount of money spent by U.S. pharmaceutical companies on R&D 
grew roughly twenty-five times larger. In addition to this, the pharmaceutical industry is rapidly 
changing in the type of innovation and rate of patenting. The total number of patents filed and 
total R&D spending have both been increasing, while the productivity of investments has 
declined. This paper aims to measure the effect of this change in innovation on firm decisions 
and performance – which may help predict firm behavior in the future. If firms realize that these 
secondary innovations, which define the changing pharmaceutical industry, actually do not add 
much to their market values, these types of innovations may begin to decrease. This could be 
detrimental to not only firms in the industry, but to society as a whole. These innovations matter 
to consumers who are paying the high prices for drugs produced by these patent-formed 
monopolies. Cases of manipulating the patenting system are becoming a source of concern as a 
moralistic responsibility to provide consumers with affordable, efficient drugs comes into play. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to measure the value that secondary innovations contribute 
to a pharmaceutical firm’s market value. In other words, does secondary innovation, which 
represents the new, emerging trend, truly matter from a firm’s perspective? Should firms 
continue research and development to improve upon a drug that has already been patented? In 
order to answer these questions, we analyze patent portfolios of pharmaceutical firms over a 23-
year period. We look at changes in patent portfolios over time, and using the fixed effects and 
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instrumental variable approaches, we compare these changes to market capitalization data for 
each firm in order to assess the relationship between secondary innovation and market value. 
In the next section, we provide general background information needed to understand the 
research question and, more specifically, the U.S. patenting system. In section III, we provide a 
summary of research from the past and explain our contributions to the already existing 
literature. In section IV, we explain our theoretical approach, and in section V, we develop an 
empirical model used for our analysis. In section VI, we describe the data and point out 
noteworthy trends. In sections VII and VIII, we discuss the econometric approaches used and 
produce results, concluding in section IX with remarks about potential implications and our 
major findings. 
 
II.   Background 
The patenting system in the United States was designed to incentivize innovation. The 
pharmaceutical industry, with its high R&D costs, requires very attractive incentives in order for 
any research or innovation to occur. Patents on innovative drugs provide such incentives by 
protecting firms from competition and therefore granting them market power to set their own 
prices. In theory, the patenting system is meant to increase innovation to a more socially optimal 
level. In practice, however, firms may manipulate the patenting system to maintain market power 
beyond a socially desirable level. Langinier (2004) explains that if market profitability is high, a 
competitor will enter the market through further innovation on the patented product. Patents are 
therefore barriers-to-entry only when the market is not highly profitable. This finding illuminates 
the idea that the motivation behind patenting resides in potential firm profits, creating a complex 
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chain of decisions that all influence a firm’s decision whether or not to conduct R&D and patent 
a product. 
After the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, generic entry became easier as firms did not have 
to conduct clinical trials for generic drugs anymore. By simply showing bioequivalence, they are 
now able to bypass this costly stage, resulting in the surge of generic-producing firms in the 
market. Simultaneously, the Hatch-Waxman Act intended to stimulate innovation by providing 
three years of market exclusivity to incrementally modified versions of original drugs. Since 
then, secondary innovation has drastically increased. In addition, patents on new compounds or 
active ingredients have been decreasing in percentage, as innovators are not able to come up with 
new chemical compounds and are relying on secondary innovation to build upon already existing 
innovation. As a result, the majority of primary innovation is being conducted in smaller labs 
within biotech firms. Therefore, the pharmaceutical industry is moving away from such 
innovation. New secondary patents coming out of the pharmaceutical industry are called 
functional patents, which introduce new uses for or slightly modified versions of previous 
innovations. Figure 4 shows the drastic increase in the number of claims filed per year; 
specifically, the increase in functional claims (method and formulation claims) demonstrate this 
rise in secondary innovation. 
  
III.   Literature Review 
There is dense literature on the pharmaceutical industry in general, as the complex 
regulatory system attracts much research. Acting as a prime example of a market needing high 
incentives for optimal social benefits, some literature in the past has specifically focused on 
generic entry and competition within the pharmaceutical sector. There have also been many 
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papers on the game theory involved in patent introductions, patent thickets, and lifecycle 
management strategy. Early on, Griliches (1981) paved the way for studies that dealt with patent 
valuation. He finds a relationship between market value and the intangible capital of a firm and 
further concludes that R&D expenditures and the number of patent applications are good 
measures of inputs into the model.  
Ariel Pakes (1985) first introduced the relationship between patent applications, a firm’s 
innovative activity, and a measure of its inventive output – the stock market value of the firm. 
Pakes used stock market values for the first time, arguing that the public-good characteristics of 
inventive output make it extremely difficult to market, and that “changes in the stock market 
value of the firm should reflect changes in the expected discounted present value of the firm’s 
entire uncertain net cash flow stream” (Pakes 392).  
Many years later, Graham and Higgins (2007) find that the relationship between R&D 
expenditures and new product introductions is smaller than previously reported, implying that 
research productivity has been declining. This conclusion puts earlier findings back into 
question. As Griliches stated in 1981, R&D expenditures and the number of patent applications 
are good inputs into the function for market value. If research productivity has been declining, 
however, does this function behave differently? Does a patent portfolio now hold more 
importance in terms of reflecting a firm’s innovative level? Our paper hopes to answer these 
questions. Graham and Higgins also find that there exists no relationship between firm size and 
new product introductions, an important finding for our study as firm sizes differ significantly in 
our dataset. The loss of research productivity over time is also mentioned by Choi and Gerlach 
(2014). They conclude that it becomes impractical to develop a new product that doesn’t infringe 
on another firms’ patent portfolio as the number of patents have drastically increased over time. 
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This finding could explain a slowdown in the number of patent applications or approvals on 
primary innovations and the change in the patent composition, as well. 
The findings from this paper will add to the existing literature, expanding on previous 
work by using patent and market data collected over a 23-year period. We hope to use this 
unexplored data set in order to test whether Griliches’ findings from 1981 (that there exists a 
relationship between market value and the intangible capital of a firm) holds in an empirical 
framework many years after his publication. The idea of modeling firm market value through 
patent portfolios and the types of claims listed has not been deeply explored in the past. 
Furthermore, we will address unanswered questions regarding secondary innovation, which is 
often times a new and overlooked concept in innovation literature. The growing importance of 
secondary innovation needs to be understood in a technical way, and we provide methods by 
which economists and policymakers can better make sense of such a complex and dynamic 
industry. More specifically, we use empirical methods to explore the impact of different types of 
patent claims on firm market value in hopes of explaining the relationship between this new 
innovation trend and the growth in the pharmaceutical industry’s market capitalization over time.  
 
IV.   Theoretical Approach 
 Does a firm’s market capitalization data truly reflect its value? A foundational paper 
released in 1970 by Eugene Fama argues that the stock market “fully reflects” available 
information if transaction costs of obtaining information and trading are low, as they are in the 
U.S. This became known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which suggests that in an 
efficient market, profiting from predicting price movements is very difficult and highly unlikely 
(Clarke et al.). An efficient market adjusts prices quickly to new information; therefore, current 
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security prices reflect all available information. We use the EMH as the basis of our theoretical 
model so that we can extend it to support the validity and strength of our empirical model. 
In the Efficient Market Hypothesis, there are three forms of market efficiency. The first is 
the weak form, in which a random-walk model is used. In this form of efficiency, prices are 
based on past prices and information. Since the stock market does not move randomly, evidence 
against this form is strong, causing many economists to reject its applicability. The second form 
of market efficiency is the semi-strong form, in which markets do not over or under react to new 
public information. Current prices incorporate all publicly available information. This form is 
widely accepted as investors have equal access to public information for U.S. markets. In the 
third form of market efficiency, strong-form, current prices fully incorporate all existing 
information, including both public and private (insider) information. Since private information is 
not commonly traded upon in the pharmaceutical industry (average people do not know what is 
always in a pharmaceutical firm’s drug pipeline), this form is not applicable to our study. In fact, 
Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) explain that market frictions may limit market 
efficiency, concluding that semi-strong market efficiency is the most realistic for many cases. 
Furthermore, since our study is a long-term study, we use the semi-strong form to support the 
argument that current stock prices contain all available information, making market 
capitalization data an accurate representation of a firm’s true market value. Furthermore, in “The 
Financial Information Content of Perceived Quality,” David Aaker and Robert Jacobson (1994) 
found that stock prices accurately reflect product quality of a firm, a finding that further 
strengthens the use of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a theoretical model for our study of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
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Applying this theory to describe our theoretical model, we see that market value is a 
function of a firm’s assets, including both tangible (labor, capital, R&D, etc.) and intangible 
(knowledge or innovation in the form of patents). Information on both of these asset groups are 
available to the public, and therefore stock prices should accurately reflect the firm’s value in the 
market (Fama). Costs that act as investments (such as research and development costs) are inputs 
in the function of market value and can be easily measured, as well. Intangible knowledge assets, 
such as the number of patents held and the types of claims filed, are also inputs to the function. 
By the Efficient Market Hypothesis, we assume that markets are correctly valuing firms and 
therefore that the error term has mean zero given that all assets are accounted for in this model. 
 
V.   Empirical Model 
The model that Griliches employed in his 1981 publication, “Market value, R&D, and 
patents,” is simple and lacks many variables that also may change stock market prices. The 
empirical model employed for this study uses the firm’s patent portfolio as its main right-hand 
side variable and the firm’s market capitalization as its left-hand side variable. Research and 
development expenditure is also included in the equation, and it is lagged once as R&D 
expenditure is expected to bring future profits rather than immediate gain. Therefore, our 
regressions begin with 1987 as we use 1986 data for our lagged R&D values. 
While trying to answer our research question, however, we come across the problem of 
endogeneity. There are factors that influence both the decision to patent and also the market 
value of the firm. In technical terms, this implies that the covariance of the independent variable 
(the patent portfolio) and the error term does not equal zero. For example, if a firm such as Pfizer 
had an exceptionally strong labor force compared to other pharmaceutical firms, a simple linear 
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regression may not capture that difference. In order to control for the endogeneity in our 
research, we use the firm fixed effects approach. Things that may differ across firms include 
labor force quality in management and research, legal services quality, access to technology, etc. 
To account for these differences, we introduce a firm dummy variable that is constant over time, 
represented by µi. We also include the S&P 500 Index in our regression in order to account for 
average stock market movements in that year (time control) since the S&P Pharmaceuticals 
Select Industry Index is only available for years following 1996. This also controls for inflation 
and other market changes that occurred over time, leaving R&D expenditure and patent 
information as the only determinants that should cause deviation in market value from the stock 
market average. Furthermore, a trend variable is also included in our model, which is simply the 
number of years since the beginning of the data set (1987). This variable accounts for the fact 
that market capitalization should be increasing over time due to technological progresses in the 
industry, a factor not explained by any other variables in the model.  
This creates our empirical model: 
log(MarketValuei,t) = B0 + B1(NumPatentsi,t) + B2(PropClaimsi,t) + B3(R&Di,t) + 
B4(R&Di,t-1) + B5(S&Pt) + B6(Trendt) + µi  + εi,t 
 
MarketValuei,t – Market capitalization of firm i in time t, $ 
NumPatentsi,t – Number of patents held by firm i in time t 
PropClaimsi,t – Proportion of claim categories for firm i in time t 
R&Di,t – Research and development expenditure for firm i in time t 
R&Di,t-1 – Research and development expenditure for firm i in time t-1 
S&Pt – S&P 500 Index in time t 
Trendt – (t – 1987) 
µi  - firm dummy variable 
εi,t – (zero-mean) error term 
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Some additional modifications were also made to the simple baseline model described 
above. In order to accurately interpret our results, we transform our claim data into proportions. 
We do so by summing total claims and diving each category by the total. Therefore, we are able 
to use one type of category as a base and interpret a marginal change in the composition of 
claims (e.g. the impact of a 1 percent increase in formulation claims as compared to a 1 percent 
increase in compound claims). Similarly, we take the logarithm of our market capitalization 
values in order to interpret the results as a percent change in market value rather than an absolute 
change.  
Although the fixed effects approach helps us account for firm differences, it may not be 
enough to address all of the complexities in our research. Therefore, we also employ the 
instrumental variable approach in order to account for changes in factors across firms over time. 
For example, if a new policy promotes and incentivizes innovation in a certain field, the 
pharmaceutical firms specializing in that field would reap the benefits more than those that are 
not as specialized. We would not see this in our results, and therefore, we must control for any 
drastic changes in incentives in the pharmaceutical industry that affect varying firms differently 
over time since our data contains large amounts of heterogeneity. In order to account for these 
changes, we use instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the error term but correlated 
with the independent variable (number of patents). In other words, they affect the patent portfolio 
of a firm without affecting its management quality, legal services department quality, 
researchers’ knowledge, or anything else contained in our error term εit. The instruments that we 
employ for this study include FDA regulatory changes, acts of Congress, and a landmark 
Supreme Court case decision, all described below. 
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•   Instrumental Variable I: (1992) Prescription Drug User Fee Act – requires drug and 
biologics manufacturers to pay additional fees for product applications and supplements.  
•   Instrumental Variable II: (1995) Uruguay Round Agreements Act – extends the patent 
terms of U.S. drugs from 17 to 20 years; also called Patent Term Restoration Act. 
•   Instrumental Variable IIIa: (1999) Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
– reduced approval time drastically for pharmaceutical patents. 
•   Instrumental Variable IIIb: (1999) American Investors Protection Act – made 
application fees cheaper, introduced First Inventor Defense, which provides defense for 
prior users when patent infringement happens, and includes the Patent Term Guarantee 
Act, which extends patent terms to account for USPTO delays. 
•   Instrumental Variable IV: (2002) Supreme Court ruling of FTC v. Schering-Plough – 
In this decision, the judges upheld a pay-for-delay settlement over the drug K-Dur 
(Jacobo-Rubio et. al.). Schering-Plough attempted to pay off Upsher-Smith Laboratories 
and American Home Products Corporation to delay the entry of their generic versions of 
K-Dur. This ruling showed that patent-holding firms can legally pay off future generics 
producers in order to longer maintain market power. 
 
A simple first-stage model for the instrumental variable approach is given by: 
NumPatentsi,t = π0 + π1(Zt) + π2(Xi,t) + γi,t 
Here, NumPatentsi,t is again the number of patents of firm i at time t, and Zt is the instrumental 
variable(s) we employ. We include Xi,t, representing (PropClaimsi,t, R&Di,t, R&Di,t-1, S&Pt, 
Trendt, µi) from our original model. We decided to use up to all four instruments for our study, as 
this creates robustness in our model. We will also have to take into account that there may be a 
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lagged effect from these policies and court cases. Therefore, other than standard binary variables 
that indicate the “before” and “after” a policy, we include variables that represent “years since” 
the implementation of a policy (which is increasing over time). By including these eight 
variables as instruments, we are able to account for any changes in the incentives to innovate and 
patent over time. Furthermore, combining these instruments with the fixed effects approach in 
our regression by using the two-stage least squares method allows for us to control for factors 
that change over time across different firms, increasing the accuracy of our model and 
estimation.  
 
VI.   Data 
The patent data that we will be using was acquired from the FDA’s Approved Drug 
Products database (The Orange Book). Since the Hatch-Waxman Act required patents associated 
with approved drugs to be listed in this database, patents and exclusivities covering each drug at 
each point in time is listed. Since The Orange Book was not published in 1986, the patent data is 
missing for that entire year, and therefore we analyze the years between 1987 and 2010. 
The patent claims data, acquired from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
was collected from old FDA and USPTO records and books and had to be manually entered into 
a system since full digitization of USPTO records was not implemented until just a few years 
ago. Therefore, the information contained in this data set has not been widely used for analysis 
prior to this study. In this data, multiple claims are listed under single patents and are classified 
as: compound, formulation, method, device, process, and other. A description of each type of 
claim, along with definitions of all other variables, is provided in Data Table 1. For our research 
purposes, we are primarily interested in analyzing formulation and method claims, which serve 
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as indicators of secondary innovation. Figure 4 shows an increasing trend in method and 
formulation claims and a stagnant trend in compound claims, supporting the argument that 
secondary innovation has been on the rise in recent decades. 
The market capitalization data was acquired from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) online database. This 
market capitalization data is our measure of market value of each individual pharmaceutical firm, 
representing the dependent variable in our study. Trends in the pharmaceutical industry’s market 
capitalization show an upward movement over this range of time, as shown in Figure 5 below. 
We see dips in total industry market capitalization during the period after September 11, 2001 (a 
time when the stock market was reacting to the terrorist attacks in the U.S.) and during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. Following from previous work by Griliches, we acquired R&D expenditure 
data for each firm to include in our regressions along with the patent data. We also obtained this 
data from CRSP through the WRDS online database. Figure 6 shows the trend in R&D 
expenditure over time, and we again see a drop in expenditure during the financial crisis. 
In order to include a time control variable, we include the S&P 500 Index for each year in 
our regressions, as well. Since the S&P Pharmaceuticals Select Industry Index only goes back to 
1996, we substitute this industry index with the S&P 500 Index as an approximation. By 
including this variable, we hope to account for time shocks in the stock market, such as the 
financial crisis of 2007. This data was also acquired from CRSP through the WRDS database. 
While creating the final data using these separate data sets, we encountered and addressed 
a handful of issues. For one, the original patent data is comprised of all filed patents – even for 
international companies that are not publicly listed in the U.S. Therefore, we drop those 
observations and focus our data on publicly listed pharmaceutical firms. The second issue that 
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we come across is within our patent data, as well. After analyzing the dataset, we notice that 
several consumer-based companies are present. Large companies such as Colgate, Bausch & 
Lomb, and Johnson and Johnson are being compared to companies such as DUSA 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and MGI Pharma, Inc. These massive consumer-based companies produce 
many different types of products such as household products, personal hygiene products, contact 
lenses, etc. This creates huge heterogeneity within our data set. However, this is similar to the 
composition of most industries in the real world. Since the pharmaceutical industry does not 
solely consist of innovation-focused firms, we see this wide range in firm size and levels of 
innovation.  
In order to correctly model the innovative segment of the industry, a few additional steps 
are taken so that results can be interpreted clearly. After running regressions on the entire data 
set, we create a subset of the data that consists of only firms labeled as “Biotech & Pharma” 
under the Bloomberg Industry Classification. We therefore drop firms listed as: Medical 
Equipment & Devices, Health Care Facilities & Services, Consumer Products, and Materials (a 
total of 316 of the 1808 observations are dropped). A list of all of the firms in our entire data set, 
along with their respective industry classifications, is provided in Data Table 2. In addition to our 
full data set, we also run regressions with firm fixed effects and instrumental variables on our 
“Biotech & Pharma” subset. We also manipulate both the full data set and the innovative subset 
by creating tertiles and quartiles within the data based on innovation level and R&D expenditure 
and then run regressions separately to compare sub-groups. In addition to the fixed effects 
regressions with instrumental variables, we also run quantile regressions on the entire data set 
and the innovative subset in order to explore our heterogeneous data further. Using all of these 
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methods, we are able to analyze the industry through many different lenses. We explain our 
diverse findings in the following sections.  
 
VII.   Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables Regression Results 
In this section, we will explain our findings using the fixed effects and instrumental 
variable approaches. Using our full data set, including consumer-based companies, we clearly 
see that in both regressions with and without the four instruments, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between method claims and market value (Table 1). Using only firm 
fixed effects, we see that an increase in the proportion of method claims by 1 percent would 
result in an increase in market value by 0.47 percent as compared to compound claims. (In all of 
our regressions and results tables we use compound claims as the base as it is the most easily 
defined category of the six. Also, we hope to interpret our results in a way that allows us to 
compare these forms of secondary innovation to primary innovation.) Using both firm fixed 
effects and the four policy instruments, we see that an increase in the proportion of method 
claims by 1 percent would result in an increase in market value by 0.624 percent as compared to 
compound claims. (Overall, we find that employing instrumental variables do not drastically 
change our results. However, they are included in all regressions in order to account for these 
important policy changes). Looking at Table 1, we see that both of these findings are significant 
at a p<0.05 level. After creating a subset of the data and including only firms labeled as “Biotech 
& Pharma,” we run the regressions again. As seen in Table 6, method claims now show 
significance at a p<0.10 level. An increase in the proportion of method claims by 1 percent 
would result in an increase in market value by 0.473 percent as compared to compound claims 
when using only firm fixed effects, and an increase in market value of 0.531 percent as compared 
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to compound claims when using both firm fixed effects and the four policy instruments. Through 
these results, we can conclude that a change in method claims would contribute more to a firm’s 
market value than would a change in compound claims. This could be understood in the context 
of recent shifts in patent portfolios as firms are now more often filing for claims on new “uses” 
of already existing innovation rather than searching for new drugs.  
In order to examine the data further, we divide it into tertiles based on the maximum 
amount of patents that a firm has ever held in a given year. We consider the first tertile the least 
innovative group (has held less than 5 patents in a specific year). The second tertile consists of 
firms that have held a maximum of anywhere in between 5 and 17 patents. The third tertile, 
considered highly innovative, consists of firms that have held more than 17 patents in a given 
year. Running fixed effects regressions with instrumental variables on these three categories of 
firms allows us to get a better understanding of how the market value of highly innovative firms 
may be affected differently by secondary innovation than the market value of lesser innovative 
firms. Looking at Table 2, we see that both lesser innovative (first tertile) and highly innovative 
firms (third tertile) show statistically significant results. In fact, we find that for lesser innovative 
firms, specifically for those that belong in the first tertile, this effect is much stronger. We see 
that an increase in either formulation or method claims of 1 percent would result in an increase 
of market value by 2.13 or 3.97 percent as compared to compound claims, respectively. For 
those firms in the second tertile, there is no significant relationship between claims and market 
value. 
It also seems as though the relationship between the number of patents and market value 
is negative for less innovative firms at a p<0.05 level (Table 2). We see this result because our 
data contains consumer-based firms with very few patents and very high market capitalization. 
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Since we created the tertiles based on the number of patents, this negative relationship is 
probably caused by those consumer-based companies. We explore this further by running the 
same regressions on our innovative subset. As shown in Table 7, we see similar results, as even 
some innovative firms may hold a few patents and have high market capitalization. We also 
notice stronger relationships between formulation or method claims and market value for lesser 
innovative firms as compared to highly innovative firms. This implies that those firms at the 
lower and the upper ends of the innovation spectrum have a statistically significant positive 
relationship between secondary innovation and market value as compared to the relationship 
between compound claims (primary innovation) and market value. The firms in the middle do 
not show such a clear relationship. 
Other than organizing by the number of patents, we organize the firms by their R&D 
expenditures. We divide the firms into quartiles, where quartile 1 refers to firms that spend less 
than $16 million on Research and Development, quartile 2 refers to firms that spend between $16 
and $68 million, quartile 3 refers to firms that spend between $68 and $577 million, and quartile 
4 refers to firms that spend between $577 million and $6.86 billion. We run regressions with firm 
fixed effects and instrumental variables I-IV on our full data set and show the results in Table 3. 
Organizing our data in this way allows for another method of interpretation. We could base our 
argument on different levels of R&D expenditures since the range of expenditure is quite large in 
the industry. Looking at our results, however, we do not see many obvious or clear relationships 
for secondary innovation. Firms that spend the least amount of money on R&D show a strong 
relationship between device and method claims and market value (Table 8). As compared to a 
traditional compound claim, an increase in method (or device) claims by 1 percent would result 
in a 1.16 (or 1.97) percent increase in market value. The category of “other” claims also shows 
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some significance (p<0.10), arguing that a 1 percent increase in other claims would result in a 10 
percent increase in market value, compared to compound claims. However, after looking at Data 
Table 8, we can see that this large coefficient may be explained by the fact that “other” claims 
for category 1 firms account for only 0.44 percent of their entire patent portfolios. Quartiles 2, 3, 
and 4 (high-spenders) do not show statistically significant results for any of the types of claims. 
This result follows along with the story of declining productivity in R&D spending. As firms 
spend billions of dollars on research and development costs, productivity or efficiency may not 
be as high as those firms that only invest a few million.  
 
VIII.   Quantile Regression Results 
In this section, we analyze the results of our quantile regressions at multiple points within 
our data (quantiles are based on our dependent variable, market capitalization). Looking at Table 
4, we see many variables with statistically significant coefficients. Specifically, the regressions 
for the 33rd quantile show very strong results, indicating that formulation, method, process, and 
other claims all have a more positive impact on market value as compared to compound claims. 
An increase in either formulation or method claims of 1 percent would result in an increase of 
market value by 0.90 and 1.11 percent, respectively. We see that formulation claims have 
approximately the same impact for firms at the 99th quantile and is also statistically significant at 
a p<0.01 level. Overall, these results show that changes in the patent portfolio from compound 
claims to the other 5 types of claims more strongly affect market value for firms at the 33rd 
percentile than those at the 99th percentile. Although larger firms display a vague relationship for 
most of the types of claims, formulation claims continue to be statistically significantly positive 
at a p-value<0.01.  
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Once we remove non-innovative firms from our data and run quantile regressions again, 
we see that most claims are statistically significant for firms at the 33rd and 66th percentiles, but 
again remain unclear for firms at the 99th percentile. Looking at Table 9, we see that the 
relationship is overall stronger for firms at the 66th percentile. Interestingly, firms at the 99th 
percentile show a statistically significantly negative relationship between device and other claims 
(as compared to compound claims). The statistically significant positive relationship between 
formulation claims and market value disappears for firms at the 99th percentile once we eliminate 
the non-innovative firms, implying that these five other types of claims are not statistically more 
positive than compound claims in their relationships with firm market value. Smaller firms show 
clearer and stronger results, as shown in Table 9.  
In order to understand these results visually, we include Figures 8-10, where we can see 
the 95 percent confidence interval and regression coefficient at each percentile. Interestingly, 
formulation claims show an S-shaped trend in Figure 8, and the confidence interval seems to get 
smaller, as well. The effect of an increase in formulation claims as compared to compound 
claims is slightly higher for firms near the 60th percentile, and although firms near the upper 
percentiles still exhibit a positive relationship (with a much tighter confidence interval), the 
impact may not be as high as for those firms located just above the median. Figure 9 shows an 
interesting trend for method claims as it displays an inverted-U. This graph shows that this 
coefficient is higher for firms near the median rather than for firms near the lower and upper 
percentiles. Lastly, Figure 10 shows a fascinating trend. The downward slope indicates that firms 
in the upper percentiles of market capitalization values actually benefit the least from this 
category of “other” claims. This trend, along with the trends in Figures 8 and 9, could be 
explained by the idea of diminishing returns. Since these huge firms have very high market 
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values, an increase in method, formulation, or other claims by one percent (as opposed to 
compound claims) may not be as effective in raising market capitalization. This could also be 
due to the fact that these large firms may have diversified their portfolios and focus on much 
more than simply pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
IX.   Conclusion 
This study analyzes the impact of secondary innovation in the pharmaceutical industry on 
firm market capitalization values. We use patent data collected from 1987-2010 in order to 
examine changes in patenting behavior and patent portfolios, and then we try to measure the 
impact of secondary innovation (a fairly new trend in the pharmaceutical industry) on market 
value and compare it with the impact of primary innovation. While analyzing patent data, we 
notice heterogeneity on several levels within the industry. Some firms have very few patents and 
very high market capitalization, while some firms have over 100 patents yet very low market 
capitalization. In order to account for heterogeneity within the industry and specifically analyze 
the innovative sector, we drop non-innovative firms, use firm fixed effects to account for 
differences between firms, and employ four instrumental variables that represent changes in the 
incentives to patent.  
Interestingly enough, we get many different results from analyzing the data through 
multiple perspectives. Overall, we find that method and formulation claims do show significance 
in their larger contribution to market value as compared to the contribution of compound claims. 
This interesting finding can be explained by the recent surge in secondary innovation (refer to 
Data Table 3). For both our full data set and our innovative subset, we find that increasing 
method claims by one percent increases market value by roughly 0.5 percent more as compared 
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to a one percent increase in compound claims. Once we break down our data into categories 
based on levels of innovation, we find that this coefficient, for both method and formulation 
claims, is much higher for lesser innovative firms (3.8 percent for method claims and 2.2 percent 
for formulation claims). For highly innovative firms, the coefficients are 1.6 percent and 2.1 
percent – indicating that positive impacts of changes in method claims are substantially stronger 
for lesser innovative firms, and the impacts of changes in formulation claims are roughly the 
same for both lesser and highly innovative firms. These results may be explained by the fact that 
lesser innovative firms usually hold fewer method claims (refer to Data Table 6) than do highly 
innovative firms – therefore, a one percent increase in method claims may seem to significantly 
influence the market value of these firms.  
Finally, we also see that firms that spend the least on research and development show 
significant results for device and method claims (Tables 3 and 8). This story stems from the 
previously identified issue of declining research productivity, and could potentially lead to an 
area for further research. Furthermore, future studies could analyze patent citations in hopes of 
better understanding firm behavior. By introducing the number and types of patent citations into 
the model, we might be able to distinguish between firms that are simply innovating for the sake 
of the patent/profitability and the firms that are innovating for the sake of research. An additional 
unexplored topic relating to our paper could focus on answering questions about mergers and 
acquisitions. In the past decade, mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry have 
been making headline news as multi-million dollar deals have begun to occur regularly. These 
findings, along with our own, could lead to many useful policy implications relating to the 
pharmaceutical industry and industrial organization. Based on our results that pharmaceutical 
firms are now seeing more growth in their market value from secondary innovation as compared 
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to primary innovation, perhaps the patenting system or related policies should be reorganized 
again in order to boost incentives. Pushing firms to focus on primary innovation in order to find 
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Data Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Short Name Variable Name  Variable Description 
 
marketcap Market Capitalization Value The market capitalization value of each firm on the  
   first day of the year in which stocks are trading. 
   Market Capitalization equals the number of shares  
   outstanding times the day average price of the stock. 
    
nopatents Number of Patents  The number of patents held by each firm in each year. 
   If a patent expires in a given year, the patent count 
   for the following year will not count it. 
    
prop_claim_compound Proportion of compound claims Compound claims contain new compounds or  
   compositions. 
    
prop_claim_form Proportion of formulation claims Formulation claims contain new formulations of 
   already existing compounds and deal with active 
    and inactive ingredients in a drug. 
    
prop_claim_method Proportion of method claims Method claims contain new methods of using a drug. 
    
prop_claim_device Proportion of device claims Device claims contain new medical devices (from  
   complicated devices used in surgery to small syringes). 
    
prop_claim_process Proportion of process claims Process claims contain new processes for manufacturing 
   a drug. 
    
prop_claim_other Proportion of other claims Other claims contain: designs/sizing of drugs, improvement 
   in devices, improvement in dosage form, creating substances  
   that resemble human DNA so that it could be used for lab  
   testing of other drugs, etc. 
    
xrd R&D Expenditure  R&D Expenditure is given for each firm in each year.  
   Units: millions of dollars. 
    
xrdlag1 R&D Expenditure lagged once R&D Expenditure from the previous year. 
    
spindx S&P 500 Index  The S&P 500 Index is a general average measure of the  
   U.S. stock market. 
    
trend Trend  The number of years since the beginning of our data set. 
   Trend = year – 1987 
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Data Table 2: Firms in Data 
Firm Name Industry Classification 
AKORN INC Biotech & Pharma 
GENZYME CORP Biotech & Pharma 
AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
DURAMED PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
AGOURON PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
CELGENE CORP Biotech & Pharma 
DENTSPLY PHARMACEUTICAL Medical Equipment & Devices 
GE HEALTHCARE Medical Equipment & Devices 
COLUMBIA LABORATORIES INC Biotech & Pharma 
NOVEN THERAPEUTICS LLC Biotech & Pharma 
MALLINCKRODT MEDICAL INC Biotech & Pharma 
AMGEN INC Biotech & Pharma 
WYETH AYERST LABORATORIES Biotech & Pharma 
INTENDIS INC Health Care Facilities & Services 
SAVIENT PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
PROCTER AND GAMBLE PHARMACEUTICALS INC SUB PROCTER 
AND GAMBLE CO Biotech & Pharma 
PHARMACIA CORP Biotech & Pharma 
COLGATE PALMOLIVE Consumer Products 
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE Biotech & Pharma 
ABBOTT PRODUCTS INC Medical Equipment & Devices 
DOW PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES Biotech & Pharma 
SCIOS INC Biotech & Pharma 
PFIZER PHARMACEUTICALS LTD Biotech & Pharma 
ORTHO MCNEIL JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
3M PHARMACEUTICALS INC Materials 
MERCK SANTE SAS Biotech & Pharma 
LEDERLE LABORATORIES DIV AMERICAN CYANAMID CO Materials 
PARKE DAVIS DIV WARNER LAMBERT CO Biotech & Pharma 
SCHERING PLOUGH CORP Biotech & Pharma 
BAUSCH AND LOMB INC Medical Equipment & Devices 
BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORP Medical Equipment & Devices 
ELAN DRUG DELIVERY INC Biotech & Pharma 
FISONS CORP Biotech & Pharma 
GENENTECH INC Biotech & Pharma 
AH ROBINS CO Medical Equipment & Devices 
CYPRESS BIOSCIENCE INC Biotech & Pharma 
FOREST LABORATORIES INC Biotech & Pharma 
TYCO HEALTHCARE GROUP LP Medical Equipment & Devices 
KV PHARMACEUTICAL CO Biotech & Pharma 
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ELI LILLY CO Biotech & Pharma 
MGI PHARMA INC Biotech & Pharma 
PAR PHARMACEUTICAL INC Biotech & Pharma 
PHARMOS CORP Biotech & Pharma 
NOVO NORDISK INC Biotech & Pharma 
ALZA CORP Biotech & Pharma 
ALPHARMA US PHARMACEUTICALS DIVISION Biotech & Pharma 
UDL LABORATORIES Medical Equipment & Devices 
SB PHARMCO PUERTO RICO INC Biotech & Pharma 
IVAX RESEARCH INC Biotech & Pharma 
ALLERGAN Biotech & Pharma 
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP DBA GLAXOSMITHKLINE Biotech & Pharma 
TEVA PARENTERAL MEDICINES INC Biotech & Pharma 
GENSIA AUTOMEDICS INC Medical Equipment & Devices 
MEDICIS PHARMACEUTICAL CORP Biotech & Pharma 
CEPHALON INC Biotech & Pharma 
MEDIMMUNE Biotech & Pharma 
ALKERMES INC Biotech & Pharma 
SEPRACOR INC Biotech & Pharma 
GENTA INC Biotech & Pharma 
PERRIGO NEW YORK INC Biotech & Pharma 
AMYLIN PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
GILEAD SCIENCES INC Biotech & Pharma 
DUSA PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
QUESTCOR PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
QLT INC Biotech & Pharma 
ACTAVIS ELIZABETH LLC Biotech & Pharma 
ASTRAZENECA LP Biotech & Pharma 
BIOVAIL LABORATORIES INTERNATIONAL SRL Biotech & Pharma 
VIVUS INC Biotech & Pharma 
PHARMACIA AND UPJOHN CO Biotech & Pharma 
CONNETICS CORP Biotech & Pharma 
NYCOMED US INC Biotech & Pharma 
MILLENNIUM PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
ANDRX LABS LLC Health Care Facilities & Services 
SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE NORTH AMERICA Health Care Facilities & Services 
CUBIST PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
PERNIX THERAPEUTICS LLC Biotech & Pharma 
WARNER CHILCOTT CO LLC Biotech & Pharma 
DEPOMED INC Biotech & Pharma 
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT INC Biotech & Pharma 
KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
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SKYEPHARMA AG Health Care Facilities & Services 
UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORP Biotech & Pharma 
WOMEN FIRST HEALTHCARE INC Consumer Products 
BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC Biotech & Pharma 
IMCOR PHARMACEUTICALS CO Medical Equipment & Devices 
ALLOS THERAPEUTICS INC Biotech & Pharma 
NOVARTIS CONSUMER HEALTH INC Biotech & Pharma 
AXCAN PHARMA US INC Biotech & Pharma 
INSMED INC Biotech & Pharma 
EMD SERONO INC Biotech & Pharma 
ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
INSPIRE PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
ISTA PHARMACEUTICALS Biotech & Pharma 
THE MEDICINES CO Biotech & Pharma 
ADOLOR CORP Biotech & Pharma 
SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
ORION CORP Consumer Products 
APP PHARMACEUTICALS LLC Health Care Facilities & Services 
ALCON LABORATORIES INC Medical Equipment & Devices 
SAVAGE LABORATORIES INC DIV ALTANA INC Biotech & Pharma 
SANOFI AVENTIS US LLC Biotech & Pharma 
NITROMED INC Biotech & Pharma 
EYETECH INC Biotech & Pharma 
ANESIVA INC Biotech & Pharma 
GTX INC Biotech & Pharma 
MEDICURE INTERNATIONAL INC Biotech & Pharma 
TERCICA INC Biotech & Pharma 
HOSPIRA INC Biotech & Pharma 
CORNERSTONE BIOPHARMA INC Biotech & Pharma 
AUXILIUM PHARMACEUTICALS Biotech & Pharma 
SANTARUS INC Biotech & Pharma 
THERAVANCE INC Biotech & Pharma 
ACORDA THERAPEUTICS INC Biotech & Pharma 
VANDA PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
NEUROGESX INC Biotech & Pharma 
JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS Biotech & Pharma 
ULURU INC Biotech & Pharma 
SUCAMPO PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
ABRAXIS BIOSCIENCE LLC Biotech & Pharma 
CUMBERLAND PHARMACEUTICALS INC Biotech & Pharma 
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Data Table 3: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) over time (Full Data) 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Year=1987	   15.6	   14.8	   12.4	   0.38	   1.02	   0.23	  
	  	   	        
Year=2000	   10.8	   22.8	   21.3	   1.83	   2.11	   0.56	  
	  	   	        





Data Table 4: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) over time (Innovative 
Subset) 
 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Year=1987	   15.07	   13.7	   9.36	   0.34	   0.83	   0.04	  
	  	   	        
Year=2000	   11.56	   22.16	   19.4	   2.19	   2.1	   0.47	  
	  	   	        





Data Table 5: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) by max number of patents 
category (Full Data) 
 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Category	  1	   8.35	   19	   18.1	   0.53	   1	   2	  
	  	   	        
Category	  2	   7	   26.6	   27.2	   1.7	   2.8	   0.62	  
	  	   	        
Category	  3	   13.3	   35	   27.7	   3.12	   5	   1.65	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Data Table 6: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) by max number of patents 
category (Innovative Subset) 
 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Category	  1	   8.1	   18.7	   15.5	   0.28	   0.85	   2.45	  
	  	   	        
Category	  2	   7.7	   25.6	   28.6	   2	   3	   0.84	  
	  	   	        




Data Table 7: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) by R&D category (Full 
Data) 
 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Category	  1	   8.2	   20.1	   22	   0.72	   1.44	   0.44	  
	  	   	        
Category	  2	   5.2	   20.2	   22.4	   1.24	   2.45	   0.45	  
	  	   	        
Category	  3	   9.3	   30.8	   26.4	   1.16	   3.34	   3.27	  
	  	   	        





Data Table 8: Patent portfolio of claims (average percentages) by R&D category 
(Innovative Subset) 
 
	   Compound	  	   Formulation	  	   Method	   Device	   Process	   Other	  
Category	  1	   9.2	   19.3	   22.6	   0.81	   1.2	   0.49	  
	  	   	        
Category	  2	   5	   19.3	   20.6	   1.42	   2.55	   0.57	  
	  	   	        
Category	  3	   8.55	   30	   25.4	   1.26	   3.22	   3.82	  
	  	   	        
Category	  4	   17.5	   34	   26.3	   3.82	   4.18	   0.83	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Table 1: Fixed Effects Regression with and without Instrumental Variables (Full Data) 
Variables	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	  I-­‐IV	  
	     
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.0097	   -­‐0.0593	  
	   (0.0075)	   (0.05569)	  
	     
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   0.00142	   0.00274	  
	   (0.00205)	   (0.00282)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.0047**	   0.00624**	  
	   (0.00222)	   (0.00252)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   -­‐0.0125	   -­‐0.00428	  
	   (0.0082)	   (0.0122)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   -­‐0.00502	   -­‐0.00278	  
	   (0.0057)	   (0.00724)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.00041	   -­‐0.00298	  
	   (0.0079)	   (0.00952)	  
	     
R&D	   0.000038	   0.000287	  
	   (.000045)	   (0.000284)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.000095	   0.000329	  
	   (0.000088)	   (0.000268)	  
	     
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.0011***	   0.00113***	  
	   (0.000155)	   (0.000156)	  
Trend	   0.0756***	   0.08117***	  
	   (0.0128)	   (0.0153)	  
	     
Observations	   1808	   1808	  
	     
R-­‐squared	   0.5042	   0.4485	  
	     
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence.	  
	   	    
 
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  and	  without	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  
the	  full	  data	  set.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  compound	  claims	  
is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	  
	  
Instrumental	  Variable	  1	  refers	  to	  the	  Prescription	  Drug	  User	  Fee	  Act	  (1992).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  2	  refers	  to	  the	  
Uruguay	  Rounds	  Agreements	  Act	  (1995).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  3	  refers	  to	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  
Modernization	  Act	  (1999)	  and	  American	  Investors	  Protection	  Act	  (1999).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  4	  refers	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  Case:	  FTC	  v.	  Schering-­‐Plough	  (2002).	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Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression with Instrumental Variables based on tertiles of the 
maximum of number of patents (Full Data) 
 
	   First	  tertile	   Second	  tertile	   Third	  tertile	  
Variables	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	  
	      
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐1.727**	   0.1479	   0.00439	  
	   (0.829)	   (0.2463)	   (0.02915)	  
	      
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  
claims	   0.0213**	   -­‐0.00926	   0.01697**	  
	   (0.00895)	   (0.00954)	   (0.00708)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.0397**	   -­‐0.001663	   0.0153***	  
	   (0.01803)	   (0.00733)	   (0.00503)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   0.0321	   -­‐0.0299	   -­‐0.00168	  
	   (0.0268)	   (0.02987)	   (0.0161)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   0.00942	   -­‐0.02014	   -­‐0.00175	  
	   (0.0207)	   (0.032)	   (0.00663)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0223	   0.00332	   0.0275	  
	   (0.02172)	   (0.01711)	   (0.0195)	  
	      
R&D	   0.00082**	   0.00088**	   -­‐5.96E-­‐05	  
	   (0.00036)	   (0.00039)	   (0.000136)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.000669**	   0.000379	   0.0000253	  
	   (0.00028)	   (0.000371)	   (0.000168)	  
	      
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.000869***	   0.00107***	   0.000896***	  
	   (0.00033)	   (0.000353)	   (0.00022)	  
Trend	   0.0818***	   0.0405	   0.06614**	  
	   (0.0275)	   (0.0435)	   (0.03008)	  
	      
Observations	   655	   561	   592	  
	      
R-­‐squared	   -­‐	   0.4112	   0.6507	  
	      
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence.	  
 
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  the	  full	  data	  
set.	  The	  data	  set	  was	  divided	  into	  tertiles	  based	  on	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  patents	  held	  by	  a	  firm	  during	  this	  23-­‐
year	  period.	  Tertile	  1	  refers	  to	  firms	  that	  have	  held	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  5	  patents,	  tertile	  2	  refers	  to	  firms	  that	  
have	  held	  up	  to	  anywhere	  in	  between	  5	  and	  17	  patents,	  and	  tertile	  3	  refers	  to	  firms	  that	  have	  held	  up	  to	  more	  
than	  17	  patents	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  
compound	  claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression with Instrumental Variables based on quartiles of R&D 
expenditure (Full Data) 
 










	       
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.2926	   -­‐0.5133**	   0.0325	   -­‐0.022	  
	   (0.3119)	   (0.259)	   (0.0536)	   (0.0211)	  
	       
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   -­‐0.00366	   0.00162	   0.00209	   -­‐0.00237	  
	   (0.00661)	   (0.0048)	   (0.00227)	   (0.0028)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.00842	   0.0177**	   0.0053	   -­‐0.00376	  
	   (0.00766)	   (0.0086)	   (0.0054)	   (0.00428)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   0.0182***	   0.0279	   -­‐0.00724	   0.00674	  
	   (0.00565)	   (0.0294)	   (0.0217)	   (0.0129)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   0.0208	   0.0772	   -­‐0.00559	   -­‐0.00997	  
	   (0.0882)	   (0.0536)	   (0.0094)	   (0.0129)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0926*	   -­‐0.0181	   -­‐0.00366	   -­‐0.00638	  
	   (0.0476)	   (0.0218)	   (0.0069)	   (0.00799)	  
	       
R&D	   0.0782***	   0.0162**	   0.000897**	   0.000145	  
	   (0.0119)	   (0.00678)	   (0.00038)	   (0.000124)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.0074	   -­‐0.00084	   0.000251	   0.00024	  
	   (0.00745)	   (0.0013)	   (0.000216)	   (0.000156)	  
	       
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.00113***	   0.00092***	   0.00093***	   0.00126***	  
	   (0.0002)	   (0.00034)	   (0.000229)	   (0.00022)	  
Trend	   -­‐0.0176	   0.0925**	   0.0338	   0.01811	  
	   (0.0229)	   (0.0375)	   (0.0261)	   (0.01877)	  
	       
Observations	   461	   450	   455	   442	  
	       
R-­‐squared	   0.3984	   -­‐	   0.5939	   0.5466	  
	       
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  confidence.	  
 
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  the	  full	  data	  
set.	  The	  data	  set	  was	  divided	  into	  quartiles	  based	  on	  average	  R&D	  expenditure	  during	  this	  23-­‐year	  period.	  These	  
variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  compound	  claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  
base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Table 4: Quantile Regressions (Full Data) 
Variables	   Quantile	  0.33	   Quantile	  0.66	   Quantile	  0.99	  
	      
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.0263***	   -­‐0.022**	   -­‐0.0105	  
	   (0.0083)	   (0.0089)	   (0.0119)	  
	      
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   0.009***	   0.0172***	   0.00988***	  
	   (0.0026)	   (0.00197)	   (0.00305)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.0111***	   0.0116***	   0.0024	  
	   (0.00265)	   (0.00156)	   (0.0038)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   0.0491*	   0.0223***	   0.0013	  
	   (0.029)	   (0.00338)	   (0.0124)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   0.0298***	   0.0373***	   -­‐0.00659	  
	   (0.0055)	   (0.00393)	   (0.01144)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0249***	   0.00641***	   0.0105***	  
	   (0.00196)	   (0.00134)	   (0.00323)	  
	      
R&D	   0.00083***	   0.0009***	   0.000787	  
	   (0.000252)	   (0.00012)	   (0.00113)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.000353	   0.001***	   0.000635	  
	   (0.00025)	   (0.00017)	   (0.0012)	  
	      
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.00093***	   0.00046**	   0.00148***	  
	   (0.00029)	   (0.00019)	   (0.000340)	  
Trend	   -­‐0.0279	   -­‐0.076***	   -­‐0.0415	  
	   (0.0175)	   (0.0124)	   (0.0258)	  
	      
Observations	   1808	   1808	   1808	  
	      
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence.	  





Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  quantile	  regressions	  at	  the	  33rd,	  66th,	  and	  99th	  quantiles	  (based	  on	  market	  capitalization)	  
for	  the	  full	  data	  set.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  compound	  
claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Table 5: Instrumental Variable First Stage Least Squares (Innovative Subset) 
Number	  of	  Patents	   Coefficients	   Robust	  F-­‐value	  (1,1481)	  
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   0.0225*	   	  
 (0.0117)	   	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.028**	   	  
 (0.013)	   	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   0.2001*	   	  
 (0.111)	   	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   0.109	   	  
 (0.073)	   	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0485	   	  
 (0.044)	   	  
R&D	   0.0049***	   	  
 (0.00068)	   	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.0046***	   	  
 (0.00083)	   	  
S&P	  500	  Index	   -­‐0.00134	   	  
 (0.000986)	   	  
Trend	   -­‐0.317**	   	  
 (0.147)	   	  
FTC	   -­‐0.412	   0.0032	  
	   (0.379)	   	  
FTC2	   0.095	   3.39	  
	   (0.71)	   	  
FDMA_AIPA	   -­‐0.193	   1.93	  
	   (0.369)	   	  
FDMA_AIPA2	   0.303	   6.66	  
	   (0.435)	   	  
URAA	   1.095***	   7.86	  
	   (0.35)	   	  
URAA2	   -­‐0.953*	   0.497	  
	   (0.49)	   	  
PDUFA	   -­‐0.131	   10.37	  
	   (0.28)	   	  
PDUFA2	   0.313	   5.92	  
	   (0.298)	   	  
 
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence. 
 
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  the	  first	  stage	  least	  squares	  estimation	  for	  the	  instrumental	  variables.	  It	  also	  provides	  
Robust	  F-­‐values	  for	  each	  instrument.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Table 6: Fixed Effects Regression with and without Instrumental Variables (Innovative 
Subset) 
 
Variables	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	  I-­‐IV	  
	     
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.00788	   -­‐0.0271	  
	   (0.0094)	   (0.0555)	  
	  
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   0.00245	   0.00286	  
	   (0.00250)	   (0.00293)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.00473*	   0.00531*	  
	   (0.00258)	   (0.00276)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   -­‐0.0111	   -­‐0.00736	  
	   (0.0096)	   (0.0133)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   -­‐0.0035	   -­‐0.00116	  
	   (0.00607)	   (0.0073)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0035	   0.00429	  
	   (0.00962)	   (0.0109)	  
	  
R&D	   0.0000316	   0.00013	  
	   (0.000051)	   (0.000278)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.000087	   0.00018	  
	   (0.000098)	   (0.000266)	  
	  
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.0011***	   0.0011***	  
	   (0.00017)	   (0.00017)	  
Trend	   0.076***	   0.078***	  
	   (0.0145)	   (0.016)	  
	     
Observations	   1492	   1492	  
	     
R-­‐squared	   0.4997	   0.4922	  
	     
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence.	  
 
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  and	  without	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  
the	  innovative	  subset.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  compound	  
claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	  
	  
Instrumental	  Variable	  1	  refers	  to	  the	  Prescription	  Drug	  User	  Fee	  Act	  (1992).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  2	  refers	  to	  the	  
Uruguay	  Rounds	  Agreements	  Act	  (1995).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  3	  refers	  to	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  
Modernization	  Act	  (1999)	  and	  American	  Investors	  Protection	  Act	  (1999).	  Instrumental	  Variable	  4	  refers	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  Case:	  FTC	  v.	  Schering-­‐Plough	  (2002). 
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Table 7: Fixed Effects Regression with Instrumental Variables based on tertiles of the 
maximum of number of patents (Innovative Subset) 
 
	   First	  tertile	   Second	  tertile	   Third	  tertile	  
Variables	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	   Firm	  Fixed	  Effects,	  IVs	  
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐1.83*	   0.372	   -­‐0.0108	  
	   (0.995)	   (0.371)	   (0.0316)	  
	  
Proportion	  of	  
formulation	  claims	   0.022**	   -­‐0.0185	   0.0211***	  
	   (0.0103)	   (0.0154)	   (0.00759)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  
claims	   0.038*	   -­‐0.0129	   0.0165***	  
	   (0.0199)	   (0.0127)	   (0.00518)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  
claims	   0.0222	   -­‐0.0474	   0.0091	  
	   (0.014)	   (0.033)	   (0.019)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  
claims	   0.0279	   -­‐0.0469	   -­‐0.00454	  
	   (0.0297)	   (0.0449)	   (0.0063)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  
claims	   0.0244	   -­‐0.00905	   0.0761*	  
	   (0.0228)	   (0.025)	   (0.0462)	  
	  
R&D	   0.00088**	   0.001**	   1.10E-­‐05	  
	   (0.00039)	   (0.00042)	   (0.00015)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.00053***	   -­‐0.00029	   0.0001	  
	   (0.00019)	   (0.000475)	   (0.00017)	  
	  
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.0008**	   0.0012**	   0.00104***	  
	   (0.00037)	   (0.00047)	   (0.00023)	  
Trend	   0.0671**	   0.0451	   0.067*	  
	   (0.027)	   (0.0558)	   (0.0347)	  
	      
Observations	   541	   467	   484	  
	      
R-­‐squared	   -­‐	   0.2453	   0.6756	  
	      
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  confidence.	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  the	  
innovative	  subset.	  The	  data	  set	  was	  divided	  into	  tertiles	  based	  on	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  patents	  held	  by	  a	  firm	  
during	  this	  23-­‐year	  period.	  Tertile	  1	  refers	  to	  firms	  that	  have	  held	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  5	  patents,	  tertile	  2	  refers	  to	  
firms	  that	  have	  held	  up	  to	  anywhere	  in	  between	  5	  and	  17	  patents,	  and	  tertile	  3	  refers	  to	  firms	  that	  have	  held	  up	  to	  
more	  than	  17	  patents	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  
of	  compound	  claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  
robust.	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Table 8: Fixed Effects Regression with Instrumental Variables based on quartiles of R&D 
expenditure (Innovative Subsets) 
 










Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.411	   -­‐0.449*	   0.0333	   -­‐0.0146	  
	   (0.253)	   (0.272)	   (0.0669)	   (0.0193)	  
	  
Proportion	  of	  
formulation	  claims	   -­‐0.00123	   0.00586	   0.00414	   -­‐0.00111	  
	   (0.00535)	   (0.00567)	   (0.00322)	   (0.00444)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  
claims	   0.0116**	   0.0177*	   0.00378	   -­‐0.00497	  
	   (0.0059)	   (0.0093)	   (0.0052)	   (0.00407)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  
claims	   0.0197***	   0.0201	   0.03333	   0.00605	  
	   (0.0054)	   (0.0266)	   (0.0319)	   (0.0172)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  
claims	   0.0587	   0.0745	   -­‐0.0094	   -­‐0.0156	  
	   (0.0719)	   (0.0578)	   (0.0129)	   (0.0148)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  
claims	   0.1007**	   -­‐0.0185	   -­‐0.00647	   0.01629	  
	   (0.0435)	   (0.0226)	   (0.00529)	   (0.0524)	  
	  
R&D	   0.0855***	   0.0178**	   0.000497**	   0.00013	  
	   (0.0185)	   (0.0069)	   (0.0005)	   (0.000121)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.00873	   -­‐0.00032	   0.000292	   0.00022	  
	   (0.00879)	   (0.00318)	   (0.000208)	   (0.000156)	  
	  
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.00117***	   0.0011***	   0.00106***	   0.00118***	  
	   (0.00027)	   (0.00037)	   (0.000262)	   (0.00025)	  
Trend	   -­‐0.0165	   0.0703*	   0.0568	   0.009	  
	   (0.0261)	   (0.0409)	   (0.0412)	   (0.0219)	  
	       
Observations	   382	   372	   374	   364	  
	       
R-­‐squared	   0.3984	   -­‐	   0.5939	   0.5466	  
	       
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  percent	  
confidence.	  
	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  firm	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  results	  with	  all	  four	  instrumental	  variables	  for	  the	  
innovative	  subset.	  The	  data	  set	  was	  divided	  into	  quartiles	  based	  on	  average	  R&D	  expenditure	  during	  this	  23-­‐year	  
period.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  compound	  claims	  is	  left	  out	  
since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Table 9: Quantile Regressions (Innovative Subset) 
 
Variables	   Quantile	  0.33	   Quantile	  0.66	   Quantile	  0.99	  
	      
Number	  of	  patents	   -­‐0.0141*	   -­‐0.0314**	   0.0123	  
	   (0.0083)	   (0.0145)	   (0.0095)	  
	  
Proportion	  of	  formulation	  claims	   0.0074***	   0.0136***	   -­‐0.00216	  
	   (0.0023)	   (0.0024)	   (0.00242)	  
Proportion	  of	  method	  claims	   0.0067**	   0.0149***	   0.00046	  
	   (0.00285)	   (0.00207)	   (0.00247)	  
Proportion	  of	  device	  claims	   0.0508	   0.0387**	   -­‐0.00645**	  
	   (0.0321)	   (0.0157)	   (0.0028)	  
Proportion	  of	  process	  claims	   0.0292***	   0.0313***	   -­‐0.00816	  
	   (0.00597)	   (0.00655)	   (0.0059)	  
Proportion	  of	  other	  claims	   0.0269***	   0.00835***	   -­‐0.0109***	  
	   (0.0012)	   (0.00251)	   (0.00126)	  
	  
R&D	   0.00056*	   0.00097***	   0.00161***	  
	   (0.000297)	   (0.00027)	   (0.00047)	  
R&D	  lagged	   0.000375	   0.00086***	   -­‐0.000032	  
	   (0.000282)	   (0.00032)	   (0.00038)	  
	  
S&P	  500	  Index	   0.00103***	   0.00056**	   0.00047**	  
	   (0.000265)	   (0.000272)	   (0.00022)	  
Trend	   -­‐0.0151	   -­‐0.074***	   -­‐0.0199	  
	   (0.0171)	   (0.0169)	   (0.015)	  
	      
Observations	   1492	   1492	   1492	  
	      
    
Significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  *90	  percent	  confidence,	  **95	  percent	  confidence,	  ***99	  
percent	  confidence.	  




Notes:	  This	  table	  provides	  quantile	  regressions	  at	  the	  33rd,	  66th,	  and	  99th	  quantiles	  (based	  on	  market	  capitalization)	  
for	  the	  innovative	  subset.	  These	  variables	  are	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  of	  market	  capitalization.	  Proportion	  of	  
compound	  claims	  is	  left	  out	  since	  it	  is	  the	  base	  for	  this	  regression.	  Standard	  errors	  given	  in	  parenthesis	  are	  robust.	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Figure 3. Kernel Density of Firms by Number of Patents. 
 
 
Year	   Firms	   Average	  Patents	  
1990	   51	   3.69	  
2000	   91	   7.46	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Mean of total formulation claims=5810 
Mean of total method claims=4328 
Mean of total compound claims=1610 
23 year period 
 
 




23 year period 
 










23 year period 
 
 
Figure 7. Scatterplot of number of patents and market capitalization. 
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Figure 9. Graph of quantile coefficients for method claims (Innovative Subset). 
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